<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Zero-Knowledge on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/zero-knowledge/</link><description>Recent content in Zero-Knowledge on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 15:12:30 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/zero-knowledge/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Hollow-LLM Attack Breaks ZK Proof Binding in LLM Inference</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-03-hollow-llm-attack-computationally-trivial-weights-in-zero-kn/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 15:12:30 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-03-hollow-llm-attack-computationally-trivial-weights-in-zero-kn/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Novel research showing ZK verification of LLM inference can be satisfied by ghost weights that collapse effective computation, letting a provider overclaim model size while proofs remain valid. Engineers building or relying on ZK-ML attestation for supply-chain trust should revisit those assumptions before treating ZK proofs as effort guarantees.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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