<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Zammad on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/zammad/</link><description>Recent content in Zammad on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 17:21:52 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/zammad/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>DIVD breach traced to chained Zammad zero-days</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-01-divd-says-zammad-zero-days-enabled-ai-driven-network-breach/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 17:21:52 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-01-divd-says-zammad-zero-days-enabled-ai-driven-network-breach/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If you self-host Zammad, identify available patches for these two chained zero-days and schedule an emergency upgrade; no KEV listing or public PoC is confirmed yet, but exploitation was demonstrated in a real breach.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> The breach illustrates how chained zero-days in support tooling can pivot to broader network access, but the summary provides no IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK-mappable TTPs to act on today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> Audit whether Zammad is in your internal or vendor tooling stack; if so, request patch confirmation from the responsible team before month end given confirmed real-world exploitation.&lt;/li>
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