<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Workflow-Injection on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/workflow-injection/</link><description>Recent content in Workflow-Injection on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/workflow-injection/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>GitHub Actions workflow injection in Snowflake connector repo via crafted issues</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-18-snowflake-github-actions-flaw-lets-crafted-issues-trigger-co/</link><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-18-snowflake-github-actions-flaw-lets-crafted-issues-trigger-co/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> This is a textbook workflow injection pattern — untrusted input from issue metadata flowing into shell steps. Audit your own repos under .github/workflows/ for any workflow triggered by issue/PR events that interpolates github.event.issue.title or body into run: commands, and replace with intermediate env vars or safe contexts.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs or active exploitation are reported, so there is nothing to hunt or detect today; however, understanding that crafted GitHub issues can trigger arbitrary commands in CI pipelines is useful context for evaluating future CI/CD-targeted campaigns.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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