<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Wmic on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/wmic/</link><description>Recent content in Wmic on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/wmic/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Microsoft removes WMIC LOLBin from Windows 11 24H2 and 25H2</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-18-microsoft-starts-removing-wmic-tool-used-by-cybercriminals/</link><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-18-microsoft-starts-removing-wmic-tool-used-by-cybercriminals/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Audit internal scripts, pipelines, and automation that call WMIC and migrate them to PowerShell WMI cmdlets before the 24H2/25H2 rollout reaches your fleet; breakage is silent until WMIC is absent.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Update detection logic: WMIC execution on Windows 11 24H2+ will become anomalous and warrant a higher-fidelity alert; also build coverage for alternative WMI access paths (PowerShell, wbemtest) that threat actors will pivot to.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s removal of a widely abused built-in tool reduces Windows 11 attack surface over time; no leadership action needed, but useful context when discussing OS hardening posture with auditors or the board.&lt;/li>
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