<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Winrar on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/winrar/</link><description>Recent content in Winrar on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 15:21:49 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/winrar/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Silent Lynx Exploits WinRAR in CIS Government Campaign</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-16-silent-lynx-exploits-winrar-flaw-to-deploy-reverse-shell-in/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 15:21:49 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-16-silent-lynx-exploits-winrar-flaw-to-deploy-reverse-shell-in/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No CVE or patch version is named, no enrichment signals exist, and targets are CIS government entities — nothing actionable for patching or configuration today, but the WinRAR exploitation chain is worth tracking if a specific CVE surfaces.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The multi-stage chain — macro-enabled lures → PS2EXE dropper → GitHub-hosted PowerShell C2 → WinRAR delivery — maps to detectable ATT&amp;amp;CK behaviors; consider building or tuning detections for GitHub-domain PowerShell callbacks and PS2EXE execution patterns this quarter.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>