<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Windows-Malware on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/windows-malware/</link><description>Recent content in Windows-Malware on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:42:13 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/windows-malware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>SLEEPWALKER Backdoor: Dormant DLL Activated by Crafted Packet, Runs Custom Bytecode</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-26-newly-sleepwalker-backdoor-waits-for-one-crafted-packet-then/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:42:13 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-26-newly-sleepwalker-backdoor-waits-for-one-crafted-packet-then/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Novel DLL side-loading backdoor with a magic-packet trigger and custom bytecode interpreter — no KEV, PoC, or active exploitation reported. Worth understanding the side-loading pattern to evaluate unsigned DLL monitoring and application allowlisting posture, but no immediate patch or config change is required.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> The dormant-until-triggered approach and custom bytecode execution are evasion techniques worth noting for future DLL side-loading hunt logic, but no IOCs, campaign attribution, or active exploitation are documented in this single-researcher report — nothing actionable to hunt or tune against today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>SourTrade Malvertising Uses Browser-Side Assembly to Evade Detection</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malvertising-sends-malware-in-pieces-then-makes-the-browser/</link><pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 12:14:17 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malvertising-sends-malware-in-pieces-then-makes-the-browser/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No patch or configuration action required; this is a delivery-side evasion technique exploiting the browser as an assembler using Bun runtime, relevant for understanding how malware bypasses file-hash detections on endpoints you defend.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Build or tune detections for Bun runtime executing assembled payloads and browser-initiated process chains; hunt for SourTrade IOCs published by Confiant since late 2024, focusing on impersonation of TradingView, Solana, and Luno lures in web traffic and endpoint telemetry.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>