<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Vbscript-Malware on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/vbscript-malware/</link><description>Recent content in Vbscript-Malware on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 16:27:04 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/vbscript-malware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Spread Four-Stage VBScript Worm to New Hosts</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-07-rogue-screenconnect-clients-spread-four-stage-vbscript-chain/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 16:27:04 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-07-rogue-screenconnect-clients-spread-four-stage-vbscript-chain/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> Three confirmed incidents show worm-like spread via ScreenConnect to newly connected hosts — if you run ScreenConnect, audit your relay configuration for unauthorized clients and review logs for unexpected new-host onboarding activity since the worm spreads automatically on connection.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Hunt for VBScript execution chains spawned from ScreenConnect parent processes across your estate, and sweep RMM logs for abnormal new-client connection events; initial access spans tech-support scam lures, phishing MSIs, and at least one other vector, so assume diverse entry points.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> RMM tool abuse as a worm vector is a growing pattern — use this quarter to review governance of ScreenConnect and similar remote-access tools (access restrictions, audit logging, approved-relay allowlists) before an incident forces the conversation.&lt;/li>
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