<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Usb on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/usb/</link><description>Recent content in Usb on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 11:57:16 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/usb/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Plug and Pwn: Fake USB devices exploit Windows PnP for SYSTEM access</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-13-plug-and-pwn-attack-uses-fake-usb-devices-for-windows-system/</link><pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 11:57:16 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-13-plug-and-pwn-attack-uses-fake-usb-devices-for-windows-system/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> No active exploitation or PoC pressure yet, but physical-access USB attacks leading to SYSTEM are a real hardening target — audit Group Policy and MDM settings to restrict unsigned driver installation and limit who can install devices on managed endpoints.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs or active campaign to hunt; worth understanding the PnP abuse technique to anticipate detection opportunities (e.g., monitoring for unexpected driver installs or PnP device events on sensitive hosts) if exploitation becomes active.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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