<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Trust-Signals on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/trust-signals/</link><description>Recent content in Trust-Signals on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 13:10:29 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/trust-signals/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Supply Chain Trust Signals (Stars, Downloads) Systematically Unreliable</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-24-the-software-supply-chain-as-a-market-for-lemons-a-multivoca/</link><pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 13:10:29 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-24-the-software-supply-chain-as-a-market-for-lemons-a-multivoca/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> This research formalizes what many engineers suspect: stars, download counts, and contributor activity are all gameable and now AI-inflated, making them unreliable proxies for dependency safety. No immediate patch action, but worth revisiting your dependency vetting process to move beyond cheap signals toward code audits or SBOM-based controls.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Academic framing of how adversaries game package-ecosystem signals; no IOCs or detection TTPs surfaced. Useful background for understanding why malicious packages evade automated reputation checks, but yields no immediate hunt or detection work.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> The &amp;lsquo;market for lemons&amp;rsquo; framing — where all cheap trust signals are simultaneously gameable — is useful context for a future board or audit discussion on software supply chain risk posture, but no immediate regulatory or vendor-exposure action is required.&lt;/li>
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