<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Tor on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/tor/</link><description>Recent content in Tor on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 15:56:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/tor/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>300+ Tor Exit Relays Hijacked to Steal SSH Passwords (Oct 1-5)</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-21-attackers-hijacked-over-300-tor-exit-relays-to-intercept-ssh/</link><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 15:56:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-21-attackers-hijacked-over-300-tor-exit-relays-to-intercept-ssh/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Only password-based SSH sessions routed through Tor during October 1-5 are affected. Audit SSH access logs for Tor-origin connections in that window, rotate any credentials that may have been exposed, and enforce key-only SSH authentication on all servers.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The active interception window closed October 5; build a hunt for any Tor-exit-routed SSH sessions in that period and trace subsequent authentication events from potentially stolen credentials to detect follow-on access.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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