<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Threat-Hunting on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/threat-hunting/</link><description>Recent content in Threat-Hunting on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 11:36:35 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/threat-hunting/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Hunting MacSync Stealer infrastructure via behavioral pivots</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-19-hunting-macsync-stealer-infrastructure-through-behavioral-pi/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 11:36:35 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-19-hunting-macsync-stealer-infrastructure-through-behavioral-pi/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> MacSync Stealer targets macOS endpoints and could affect developer machines or macOS-based CI runners; no patch or configuration action exists, but understanding that this stealer rapidly rotates C2 domains should inform endpoint coverage decisions for macOS assets.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s analysis identifies 30+ MacSync Stealer-attributed domains via durable behavioral pivots; hunt for connections to those domains in DNS and proxy logs since the start of MacSync activity, and encode the stable behavioral signals as detections to survive future domain rotation.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>CrowdStrike Publishes ESXi Shell Command Obfuscation Hunt Methodology</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-09-crowdstrike-threat-hunts-for-shell-command-obfuscation-on-vm/</link><pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 11:41:42 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-09-crowdstrike-threat-hunts-for-shell-command-obfuscation-on-vm/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Describes how threat actors obfuscate shell commands on ESXi hosts — no patch action indicated from the title alone, but useful for understanding attacker technique when designing ESXi hardening and logging posture.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> CrowdStrike&amp;rsquo;s hunting methodology for ESXi shell obfuscation is directly adoptable; schedule a review of the techniques and build or adapt hunt queries targeting ESXi command-line anomalies in your SIEM this quarter.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>CrowdStrike 2026 Threat Hunting Report: AI Accelerates Attacker Speed</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-03-crowdstrike-2026-threat-hunting-report-exploitation-window-c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 13:48:19 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-03-crowdstrike-2026-threat-hunting-report-exploitation-window-c/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Vendor threat hunting report likely contains updated TTPs and dwell-time trends worth reviewing to calibrate hunt cadence and detection priorities, but no actionable IOCs or specific detections are signaled here.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> High-level findings on shrinking exploitation windows and AI-driven attacker acceleration could provide useful benchmarking data for board-level risk discussions and future budget justification.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>