<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Telegram-Desktop on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/telegram-desktop/</link><description>Recent content in Telegram-Desktop on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 16:14:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/telegram-desktop/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Telegram Desktop flaw enabled one-click account takeover via file theft</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-10-telegram-desktop-vulnerability-allowed-any-user-s-file-to-be/</link><pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 16:14:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-10-telegram-desktop-vulnerability-allowed-any-user-s-file-to-be/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> A one-click account-takeover path via file theft in Telegram Desktop is a noteworthy vulnerability class, but no enrichment signals confirm active exploitation or a KEV listing; if Telegram Desktop is deployed on corporate endpoints, verify it is on the latest release.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> The technique (file theft leading to account takeover) is worth understanding for endpoint detection context, but no IOCs, ATT&amp;amp;CK mappings, or active exploitation campaigns are documented — no immediate hunt or detection action is actionable from this item alone.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>