<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Steganography on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/steganography/</link><description>Recent content in Steganography on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 11:41:22 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/steganography/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>DOUBLECUP Malware Uses PNG Files to Deliver Payloads</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-24-doublecup-s-png-payload-mon-aug-24th/</link><pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 11:41:22 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-24-doublecup-s-png-payload-mon-aug-24th/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> DOUBLECUP embeds payloads inside PNG files as an obfuscation layer rather than true steganography; worth understanding the technique when reviewing file-upload handling and egress filtering in your pipelines, but no patch or config change is required today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> The write-up surfaces a payload-delivery method using PNG files, which could inform tuning detections around suspicious image-file execution chains; however, the summary is too truncated to extract IOCs or a concrete detection rule — monitor the full SANS diary for actionable indicators.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>DOUBLECUP LaaS Uses ClickFix and PNG Steganography to Drop RAT</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-04-doublecup-uses-clickfix-and-cached-pngs-to-deliver-countload/</link><pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 13:07:50 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-04-doublecup-uses-clickfix-and-cached-pngs-to-deliver-countload/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Novel multi-stage delivery abusing browser cache for steganographic PNG staging is worth understanding when evaluating endpoint controls and browser security policies, but no patch or configuration change is required today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Build or tune detections for ClickFix PowerShell execution patterns and anomalous PNG writes to browser cache directories; the CountLoader → DeviceManager RAT chain provides new TTPs to add to hunt playbooks this quarter.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>