<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Shadow-It on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/shadow-it/</link><description>Recent content in Shadow-It on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:03:19 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/shadow-it/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Poison Claude Sells Stolen Claude Access, Intercepts All Prompts</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-06-poison-claude-sells-discounted-claude-access-while-its-opera/</link><pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:03:19 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-06-poison-claude-sells-discounted-claude-access-while-its-opera/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Underground AI proxy services capturing user prompts represent a shadow-IT risk if employees seek cheaper LLM access; audit API usage logs for unauthorized AI service traffic and enforce an approved-services allow-list.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Emerging TTP: threat actors operate MITM-style LLM proxy services to harvest organizational prompts at scale; no IOCs provided, but this informs future DLP and proxy-monitoring detection design for AI service abuse.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> If employees use discounted underground AI services, proprietary business data in their prompts flows directly to threat actors; review and communicate AI acceptable-use policy and evaluate DLP controls for prompt exfiltration this quarter.&lt;/li>
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