<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Secure-Boot on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/secure-boot/</link><description>Recent content in Secure-Boot on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 12:11:39 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/secure-boot/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>11 Old Microsoft-Signed UEFI Shims Enable Secure Boot Bypass</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-15-11-old-microsoft-signed-linux-uefi-shims-could-let-attackers/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 12:11:39 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-15-11-old-microsoft-signed-linux-uefi-shims-could-let-attackers/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> No active exploitation or PoC yet, but these are legitimately signed shims that could be weaponized for UEFI bootkit deployment — audit your systems&amp;rsquo; Secure Boot allowlists and verify no deprecated shim binaries are present in your boot chain.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> UEFI bootkit delivery via trusted-but-vulnerable signed shims is a useful persistence vector to understand; no exploitation is occurring now and no IOCs or detection guidance are available yet, but worth filing against future UEFI anomaly detection work.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>