<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Pypi on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/pypi/</link><description>Recent content in Pypi on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:57:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/pypi/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Malicious LiteLLM PyPI Releases Stole Cloud/K8s Creds from 2,100+ Orgs</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-12-malicious-litellm-releases-tied-to-trivy-hack-may-have-expos/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:57:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-12-malicious-litellm-releases-tied-to-trivy-hack-may-have-expos/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> If LiteLLM was installed in any environment during March 2026, assume cloud keys, SSH keys, and Kubernetes tokens from that system were exfiltrated — rotate all credentials from affected hosts and audit CI/CD pipeline logs for installs during that window.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Hunt for anomalous cloud API activity and Kubernetes token usage dating back to March 2026 on any host where LiteLLM was installed; CloudSEK&amp;rsquo;s 434,000-file dataset suggests usable IOC context is emerging, so watch for actor TTPs tied to the Trivy campaign.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Act:&lt;/strong> Confirm with engineering whether LiteLLM or Trivy are in use in the AI/ML stack; if so, direct a credential-rotation audit this week and assess whether any customer data environments were reachable from affected systems — 2,100+ exposed organizations makes this a peer-company disclosure risk worth tracking.&lt;/li>
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