<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Pwn2own on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/pwn2own/</link><description>Recent content in Pwn2own on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:26:04 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/pwn2own/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Pwn2Own Ireland 2026: $1.26M paid for 98 zero-days</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-09-hackers-get-1-262-000-for-98-zero-days-at-pwn2own-ireland/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:26:04 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-09-hackers-get-1-262-000-for-98-zero-days-at-pwn2own-ireland/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Contest zero-days are under responsible-disclosure embargo until vendors patch; monitor vendor advisories over the coming weeks for products you run, especially edge devices and browsers commonly targeted at Pwn2Own.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Useful data point for board-level discussions on software attack surface breadth; no specific vendor or product is named in available reporting, so no vendor-risk action is warranted yet.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Three Teams Remotely Exploit Fully Patched Pixel 10 at Pwn2Own Ireland</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-09-three-teams-demonstrate-remote-hacks-of-fully-patched-google/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:26:04 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-09-three-teams-demonstrate-remote-hacks-of-fully-patched-google/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Remote code execution on a fully patched Pixel 10 is noteworthy research, but no patch or public PoC is available yet and mobile handsets are outside the typical cloud/AppSec engineering stack; monitor Google&amp;rsquo;s security bulletins for patches once they drop.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Contest rules channel these exploits to the vendor privately, so there are no IOCs, public TTPs, or active exploitation signals to hunt; file as background awareness of Pixel attack surface until Google publishes details.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> A controlled competition result with no active exploitation; if the org manages a corporate Pixel fleet, note that remote compromise of fully patched devices is now demonstrated and watch for Google&amp;rsquo;s patch announcement to assess MDM policy response.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Samsung Galaxy S26 hacked three times more at Pwn2Own Ireland</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-08-samsung-galaxy-s26-hacked-three-more-times-at-pwn2own-irelan/</link><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 17:51:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-08-samsung-galaxy-s26-hacked-three-more-times-at-pwn2own-irelan/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Pwn2Own findings highlight zero-day surface on Android/Samsung devices, but no CVEs, patches, or PoCs are public yet; monitor Samsung&amp;rsquo;s coordinated disclosure process for any vulnerabilities affecting enterprise mobile deployments.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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