<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Process-Injection on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/process-injection/</link><description>Recent content in Process-Injection on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 13:01:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/process-injection/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AutoIT Used for Process Injection in Active Malware Campaigns</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-28-autoit-payload-injector-tue-jul-28th/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 13:01:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-28-autoit-payload-injector-tue-jul-28th/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> AutoIT&amp;rsquo;s scripting capabilities make it an easy vehicle for injecting payloads into remote processes; no patch exists for this technique, but understanding it may prompt reviewing whether AutoIT is needed in your environment or blocked in application allow-lists.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> This SANS ISC diary provides technical detail on AutoIT-based process injection worth translating into detection rules; consider adding Sigma/EDR detections for AutoIT spawning unusual child processes or performing remote thread injection.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>OkoBot Malware Injects Seed Phrase Phishing Into Ledger/Trezor Apps</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-16-okobot-malware-framework-injects-seed-phrase-phishing-into-l/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:18:39 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-16-okobot-malware-framework-injects-seed-phrase-phishing-into-l/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> OkoBot&amp;rsquo;s technique of injecting malicious UI into a legitimate, running desktop application without tampering with the binary is a relevant threat model for any desktop software you ship or review; no patch action exists on the defender side, but it informs how you think about process isolation and UI integrity for sensitive operations.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> The TTP — waiting for a specific USB device event to trigger an overlay inside a trusted process — is worth understanding for behavioral detection theory, but no IOCs or confirmed enterprise victim telemetry are provided, making active hunting premature.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>