<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Physical-Security on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/physical-security/</link><description>Recent content in Physical-Security on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:32:56 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/physical-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>US Customs supervisor stole CPUs/RAM from DHS PCs, sold on Newegg</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-15-us-customs-supervisor-busted-for-stealing-hardware-from-home/</link><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:32:56 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-15-us-customs-supervisor-busted-for-stealing-hardware-from-home/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> A concrete insider-threat case involving hardware substitution that evaded detection — useful context for thinking about physical asset integrity controls and insider detection gaps, though no IOCs or detection rules apply here.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Illustrates insider-threat risk from privileged physical access; useful as a reference case when reviewing asset inventory controls or briefing leadership on insider-threat program gaps.&lt;/li>
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