<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Persistence on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/persistence/</link><description>Recent content in Persistence on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 11:49:48 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/persistence/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>ClickOnce Abused for Persistent Threat Actor Access (Part 2)</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-11-new-abuse-of-the-clickonce-technology-part-2-stop-threat-act/</link><pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 11:49:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-11-new-abuse-of-the-clickonce-technology-part-2-stop-threat-act/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Describes how attackers abuse the ClickOnce deployment mechanism for persistence in Windows environments — no patch or config change indicated, but worth understanding if you deploy .NET apps or manage Windows estates.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> New ClickOnce-based persistence TTP with public CrowdStrike analysis — build or tune detections around ClickOnce application installations and associated scheduled tasks or registry run keys in your SIEM/EDR.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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