<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Oracle on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/oracle/</link><description>Recent content in Oracle on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:03:19 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/oracle/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>khunt Toolkit Exploits Oracle Java Compilation for Fileless SYSTEM Access</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-06-attackers-compile-khunt-inside-oracle-to-turn-sql-injection/</link><pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:03:19 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-06-attackers-compile-khunt-inside-oracle-to-turn-sql-injection/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> Active exploitation chain: SQL injection in a public-facing app leads to fileless SYSTEM access via Oracle&amp;rsquo;s Java stored procedure compilation. Audit web app inputs for SQLi, disable Oracle Java execution capabilities if unused (&lt;code>DBMS_JAVA&lt;/code> grants), and inspect Oracle schema objects for unauthorized compiled Java classes.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Huntress is tracking this active toolkit (khunt); the fileless approach bypasses standard file-write detections. Hunt for anomalous Java stored-procedure compilation events in Oracle audit logs and alert on SYSTEM-level process spawning from Oracle service accounts since at least the date of this report.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> Active exploitation of SQL injection against Oracle databases reaching OS-level access is a credible risk for any organization with public-facing Oracle-backed apps. Ask your team to confirm SQLi controls and Oracle hardening are in place this quarter.&lt;/li>
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