<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Mozilla on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/mozilla/</link><description>Recent content in Mozilla on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:57:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/mozilla/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Mozilla rotates Firefox/Thunderbird GPG signing key after GitHub leak</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-12-mozilla-updates-gpg-signing-key-for-firefox-releases-after-e/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:57:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-12-mozilla-updates-gpg-signing-key-for-firefox-releases-after-e/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If your pipelines or package managers verify Firefox or Thunderbird downloads against Mozilla&amp;rsquo;s GPG key, update your keyring to the new signing key; automated verification scripts referencing the old key will fail or trust a compromised key.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No exploitation signals or IOCs reported; the key rotation is a supply chain hygiene incident worth understanding for context on how signing-key exposure can create a window of trust ambiguity before rotation.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Mozilla acted quickly to rotate after accidental exposure with no confirmed misuse — a useful case study in supply chain key incident response, but no vendor attestation or internal exposure assessment is warranted at this time.&lt;/li>
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