<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Mobile-Exploit on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/mobile-exploit/</link><description>Recent content in Mobile-Exploit on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:26:04 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/mobile-exploit/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Three Teams Remotely Exploit Fully Patched Pixel 10 at Pwn2Own Ireland</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-09-three-teams-demonstrate-remote-hacks-of-fully-patched-google/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:26:04 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-09-three-teams-demonstrate-remote-hacks-of-fully-patched-google/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Remote code execution on a fully patched Pixel 10 is noteworthy research, but no patch or public PoC is available yet and mobile handsets are outside the typical cloud/AppSec engineering stack; monitor Google&amp;rsquo;s security bulletins for patches once they drop.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Contest rules channel these exploits to the vendor privately, so there are no IOCs, public TTPs, or active exploitation signals to hunt; file as background awareness of Pixel attack surface until Google publishes details.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> A controlled competition result with no active exploitation; if the org manages a corporate Pixel fleet, note that remote compromise of fully patched devices is now demonstrated and watch for Google&amp;rsquo;s patch announcement to assess MDM policy response.&lt;/li>
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