<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Mitm on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/mitm/</link><description>Recent content in Mitm on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:44:28 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/mitm/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>eMudhra Intermediate CA Private Keys Compromised, MitM Risk</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-23-emudhra-intermediate-ca-certificates-compromised/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:44:28 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-23-emudhra-intermediate-ca-certificates-compromised/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> Audit your certificate inventory now for any eMudhra-issued TLS certs; any certificate signed by one of the eight compromised intermediates must be replaced and the intermediates should be distrusted in your trust stores.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> No IOCs are published yet, but build or tune detections for certificate validation failures and unexpected CA chain presentations that could indicate MitM use of fraudulently issued eMudhra certs; add eMudhra intermediate serial numbers to watchlists once revocation details are public.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Act:&lt;/strong> Confirm with your security team whether any customer-facing or internal services rely on eMudhra-issued certificates; if so, request remediation status and prepare to notify affected parties given the MitM interception risk this poses to encrypted communications.&lt;/li>
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