<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Malvertising on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/malvertising/</link><description>Recent content in Malvertising on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 15:05:08 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/malvertising/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>StreamRat Android Banking Trojan Spread via Meta Ads to 570K EU Accounts</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-02-meta-ads-push-streamrat-android-trojan-that-can-gain-near-co/</link><pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 15:05:08 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-02-meta-ads-push-streamrat-android-trojan-that-can-gain-near-co/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> StreamRat demonstrates a malvertising delivery chain for Android banking trojans capable of near-complete device takeover; worth noting the ad-platform distribution vector for mobile threat modeling, though no IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK mappings are available to act on today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Malvertising campaign assembles malware in browser memory via JS</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malicious-sites-use-javascript-to-build-malware-in-browser-m/</link><pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 12:14:17 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malicious-sites-use-javascript-to-build-malware-in-browser-m/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> This technique—assembling malware entirely within browser memory via JavaScript—bypasses file-based detection and signals a shift in delivery model worth factoring into client-side defense strategies (CSP hardening, browser isolation). No specific software to patch; no KEV or PoC signals.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The campaign is described as large-scale and targets users of crypto/trading sites; build or tune EDR behavioral rules for in-browser memory injection and anomalous JS execution patterns this quarter. The summary provides no specific IOCs to hunt on immediately.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>SourTrade Malvertising Uses Browser-Side Assembly to Evade Detection</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malvertising-sends-malware-in-pieces-then-makes-the-browser/</link><pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 12:14:17 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malvertising-sends-malware-in-pieces-then-makes-the-browser/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No patch or configuration action required; this is a delivery-side evasion technique exploiting the browser as an assembler using Bun runtime, relevant for understanding how malware bypasses file-hash detections on endpoints you defend.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Build or tune detections for Bun runtime executing assembled payloads and browser-initiated process chains; hunt for SourTrade IOCs published by Confiant since late 2024, focusing on impersonation of TradingView, Solana, and Luno lures in web traffic and endpoint telemetry.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Bing malvertising campaign delivers SectopRAT via fake Claude installer</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-24-fake-claude-app-promoted-by-bing-ads-pushes-sectoprat-malwar/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:43:46 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-24-fake-claude-app-promoted-by-bing-ads-pushes-sectoprat-malwar/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No direct infrastructure vulnerability here; the attack targets end users via social engineering. Worth noting that AI-tool-themed lures are an emerging pattern that should inform employee software-download guidance.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Active SectopRAT delivery campaign in progress — query EDR telemetry for downloads of unofficial Claude installers and sweep endpoints for SectopRAT indicators; the BleepingComputer writeup likely contains file hashes and C2 indicators to feed into your SIEM.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> AI-tool-themed malvertising is a growing employee-targeting vector; useful context for justifying security-awareness investment, but no immediate leadership action required absent evidence of internal compromise.&lt;/li>
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