<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Linux-Security on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/linux-security/</link><description>Recent content in Linux-Security on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 18:11:48 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/linux-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>TPM-Attest: TPM 2.0 + IMA as kernel-level anti-cheat replacement for Linux</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-21-tpm-attest-hardware-rooted-integrity-attestation-as-a-kernel/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 18:11:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-21-tpm-attest-hardware-rooted-integrity-attestation-as-a-kernel/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The attestation architecture — binding TPM quotes to server nonces, constructing Merkle trees over IMA logs, and using LD_PRELOAD to intercept SDK calls — offers transferable patterns for zero-trust device health and supply-chain integrity checks, though no running systems need changes today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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