<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Linux-Malware on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/linux-malware/</link><description>Recent content in Linux-Malware on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 11:32:44 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/linux-malware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>14 Trojanized npm Packages Deploy RedC2 4.0 Linux Backdoor via Supply Chain</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-22-14-trojanized-npm-packages-drop-redc2-4-0-linux-backdoor-wit/</link><pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 11:32:44 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-22-14-trojanized-npm-packages-drop-redc2-4-0-linux-backdoor-wit/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> Active supply-chain compromise in npm packages is an Act signal regardless of KEV status — audit your dependency tree immediately for these 14 packages masquerading as calendar/streak utilities and check CI build logs for processes spawned by node_modules executing detached binaries.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The implant&amp;rsquo;s load behavior — extracting a bundled binary, chmod-ing it, and launching it as a detached process — is a detectable Linux TTP; build or tune EDR rules to alert on node/npm processes spawning unexpected child executables, but the summary lacks IOCs or package names needed to hunt right now.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> An active npm supply-chain campaign using AI-assisted C2 signals an escalating threat class; this quarter, direct engineering to verify SCA tooling covers npm and confirm your CI pipelines would catch a malicious package load before it reaches production.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>