<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Key-Management on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/key-management/</link><description>Recent content in Key-Management on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 11:57:16 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/key-management/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Mozilla Revokes Firefox/Thunderbird Linux Signing Key After Repo Leak</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-13-mozilla-revokes-firefox-and-thunderbird-linux-signing-key-af/</link><pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 11:57:16 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-13-mozilla-revokes-firefox-and-thunderbird-linux-signing-key-af/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If your CI/CD pipelines or Linux packaging workflows verify Firefox or Thunderbird downloads using the revoked key, verification will fail; audit any signature-checking steps and update to Mozilla&amp;rsquo;s replacement key before the revocation takes full effect.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> A private-repo exposure with no confirmed external access or exploitation signals; no IOCs or detection work surfaced, but the incident illustrates key-material mishandling in developer workflows worth tracking for future threat modeling.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> A contained key-management incident at a major OSS vendor with no evidence of abuse; useful as a real-world case study for your own signing-key lifecycle and secret-scanning policies, but no vendor attestation or leadership brief is warranted.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Mozilla rotates Firefox/Thunderbird GPG signing key after GitHub leak</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-12-mozilla-updates-gpg-signing-key-for-firefox-releases-after-e/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:57:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-12-mozilla-updates-gpg-signing-key-for-firefox-releases-after-e/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If your pipelines or package managers verify Firefox or Thunderbird downloads against Mozilla&amp;rsquo;s GPG key, update your keyring to the new signing key; automated verification scripts referencing the old key will fail or trust a compromised key.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No exploitation signals or IOCs reported; the key rotation is a supply chain hygiene incident worth understanding for context on how signing-key exposure can create a window of trust ambiguity before rotation.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Mozilla acted quickly to rotate after accidental exposure with no confirmed misuse — a useful case study in supply chain key incident response, but no vendor attestation or internal exposure assessment is warranted at this time.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>