<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Key-Compromise on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/key-compromise/</link><description>Recent content in Key-Compromise on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:34:51 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/key-compromise/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Keystone Destroys 18,835 Wallets After Device Verification Key Stolen</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-27-keystone-to-destroy-18-835-hardware-wallets-after-hackers-st/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:34:51 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-27-keystone-to-destroy-18-835-hardware-wallets-after-hackers-st/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The attacker&amp;rsquo;s theft of a device-attestation signing key to enable undetectable counterfeits is a concrete illustration of supply-chain trust failure at the hardware level; no action required for enterprise stacks, but relevant when designing attestation or signing-key custody for your own CI/CD or hardware provisioning flows.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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