<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Kernel-Exploit on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/kernel-exploit/</link><description>Recent content in Kernel-Exploit on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 14:12:31 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/kernel-exploit/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>OpenBSD Root LPE Chains 37-Year-Old Bug, Bypasses KARL/SMAP/SMEP</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-17-researchers-demonstrate-openbsd-root-exploit-chaining-37-yea/</link><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 14:12:31 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-17-researchers-demonstrate-openbsd-root-exploit-chaining-37-yea/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> A public PoC exists and a patch has shipped, so if you run OpenBSD 7.9 on any host, upgrade immediately. No KEV listing and LPE-only scope (requires local access first) keeps this out of Act for most shops, but the PoC lowers the bar for post-compromise escalation.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No active exploitation campaign or IOCs are reported; the main value is understanding how KARL, SMAP, and SMEP mitigations can be chained past — useful context for evaluating kernel-hardening assumptions on any OS, but no hunt or detection action warranted today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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