<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Javascript-Injection on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/javascript-injection/</link><description>Recent content in Javascript-Injection on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:32:56 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/javascript-injection/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Telegram Desktop HTML Export Feature Enables Stored JS Injection</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-15-telegram-desktop-flaw-lets-hidden-javascript-exfiltrate-mess/</link><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:32:56 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-15-telegram-desktop-flaw-lets-hidden-javascript-exfiltrate-mess/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If Telegram Desktop is used in your environment for work communications, advise users to stop using the HTML chat export feature until Telegram ships a fix; no patch version cited and no KEV/PoC, but the attack chain (malicious bot message → export → browser open) is realistic enough to warrant a policy change this quarter.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Novel stored-JS-in-export technique is worth understanding for threat modeling chat-app abuse, but no IOCs, no ATT&amp;amp;CK mapping, and no evidence of active exploitation means there is no detection or hunt work to act on now.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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