<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Iranian-Apt on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/iranian-apt/</link><description>Recent content in Iranian-Apt on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 15:32:45 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/iranian-apt/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Iranian APT deploys CHOSEN BRICK Windows spyware against dissidents</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-17-iranian-hackers-use-chosen-brick-windows-malware-to-spy-on-t/</link><pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 15:32:45 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-17-iranian-hackers-use-chosen-brick-windows-malware-to-spy-on-t/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No enrichment signals and the targeting profile (dissidents, journalists, activists) is outside typical enterprise attack surface; no patch, configuration, or supply-chain action indicated.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Government-issued warning about a named Windows malware family is useful actor-context, but the summary provides no IOCs, ATT&amp;amp;CK TTPs, or detection artifacts to act on; revisit if a follow-up report publishes indicators.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Iranian state espionage campaign is worth noting for sector risk registers, especially for media, NGO, or policy-adjacent organizations, but no vendor exposure, regulatory trigger, or board-level event is present here.&lt;/li>
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