<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Iran-Nexus on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/iran-nexus/</link><description>Recent content in Iran-Nexus on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:10:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/iran-nexus/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Iran-Nexus Blinder Tunnel Campaign Hits Iraqi Infrastructure via GitHub C2</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-06-blinder-tunnel-campaign-targets-iraqi-infrastructure/</link><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:10:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-06-blinder-tunnel-campaign-targets-iraqi-infrastructure/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The use of GitHub as C2 infrastructure highlights the challenge of blocking legitimate platform abuse; worth reviewing egress policies to detect anomalous GitHub API calls from non-developer workloads, but no patch or configuration change is required today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The GitHub-as-C2 pattern is a detection gap worth closing this quarter — build or tune a detection for high-volume or scripted GitHub API calls from endpoints that shouldn&amp;rsquo;t be using it; the fake recruitment lure TTP is also worth adding to phishing hunt queries.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> An Iran-nexus campaign targeting regional critical infrastructure is useful geopolitical context for sector risk briefings, but absent any US/global enterprise targeting signal, no immediate leadership action is warranted.&lt;/li>
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