<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ipv6 on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ipv6/</link><description>Recent content in Ipv6 on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:10:27 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ipv6/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>NTP Pool Servers Abused to Harvest and Scan IPv6 Client Addresses</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-27-cleaning-the-ntp-pool-detecting-and-mitigating-ntp-sourced-i/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:10:27 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-27-cleaning-the-ntp-pool-detecting-and-mitigating-ntp-sourced-i/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If your systems query the NTP Pool and expose IPv6 addresses, those addresses may be harvested and subsequently port-scanned or enumerated by rogue pool members. Plan to evaluate replacing NTP Pool entries with specific trusted NTP servers (cloud-provider NTP, dedicated stratum-2 servers) in IPv6-enabled environments.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> The research identifies a mechanism — rogue NTP Pool membership — by which adversaries can build targeted IPv6 address lists for reconnaissance; useful context for understanding scanning sources, but no specific IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK-mapped TTPs are provided here for immediate detection work.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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