<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ipc-Security on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ipc-security/</link><description>Recent content in Ipc-Security on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 11:32:55 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ipc-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Windows Named Pipe Abuse: Access Control Hardening Guidance</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-23-named-pipes-under-attack-securing-windows-interprocess-commu/</link><pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 11:32:55 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-23-named-pipes-under-attack-securing-windows-interprocess-commu/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Good conceptual reminder that named-pipe ACLs are an exploitable surface in Windows services, but no CVE, no KEV, and no exploitation signal means no immediate patching or configuration change is required — file this as design guidance for future Windows service work.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Named-pipe abuse for lateral movement and C2 tunneling is already a documented ATT&amp;amp;CK technique (T1559.001); this article adds no new IOCs, campaigns, or detection angles beyond what existing Sigma rules and EDR behavioral detections already cover.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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