<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ios on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ios/</link><description>Recent content in Ios on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 13:48:19 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ios/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Chinese Actor Uses Leaked DarkSword Kit to Deploy GHOSTBLADE on iOS</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-03-chinese-threat-actor-uses-leaked-darksword-kit-to-deploy-gho/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 13:48:19 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-03-chinese-threat-actor-uses-leaked-darksword-kit-to-deploy-gho/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No KEV listing, EPSS, or PoC signals present; the campaign targets iOS users via fake AWS phishing pages rather than a vulnerability in cloud infrastructure itself. Worth understanding the DarkSword exploit kit&amp;rsquo;s capabilities if you manage MDM or BYOD policies, but no immediate patch or config action is indicated.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Over 100 fake AWS sign-in domains linked to a single actor provide a concrete hunting surface — search proxy/email logs for traffic to lookalike AWS domains and tune phishing detections around this lure pattern; the Censys report implies enough infrastructure detail to build IOC-based blocks.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> A Chinese threat actor running a large-scale iOS phishing campaign mimicking AWS is worth noting for sector awareness and BYOD risk discussions, but without confirmed breaches at named organizations there is no immediate board-level action required.&lt;/li>
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