<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Influence-Operations on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/influence-operations/</link><description>Recent content in Influence-Operations on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:42:13 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/influence-operations/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>OpenAI Bans Russian ChatGPT Accounts Behind AI-Powered Influence Op</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-26-openai-bans-russian-chatgpt-accounts-used-to-run-influence-o/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:42:13 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-26-openai-bans-russian-chatgpt-accounts-used-to-run-influence-o/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> A concrete example of nation-state actors using commercial AI tools to run multi-platform influence operations; useful context when developing AI acceptable-use policies or briefing leadership on AI-enabled social engineering threats, but no immediate organizational action required.&lt;/li>
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