<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>In-Memory-Malware on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/in-memory-malware/</link><description>Recent content in In-Memory-Malware on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 12:14:17 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/in-memory-malware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Malvertising campaign assembles malware in browser memory via JS</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malicious-sites-use-javascript-to-build-malware-in-browser-m/</link><pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 12:14:17 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-26-malicious-sites-use-javascript-to-build-malware-in-browser-m/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> This technique—assembling malware entirely within browser memory via JavaScript—bypasses file-based detection and signals a shift in delivery model worth factoring into client-side defense strategies (CSP hardening, browser isolation). No specific software to patch; no KEV or PoC signals.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The campaign is described as large-scale and targets users of crypto/trading sites; build or tune EDR behavioral rules for in-browser memory injection and anomalous JS execution patterns this quarter. The summary provides no specific IOCs to hunt on immediately.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>