<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Imds on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/imds/</link><description>Recent content in Imds on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:39:11 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/imds/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>SANS ISC: Observed Scans Targeting Cloud Metadata Service (IMDS)</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-20-simple-scans-for-cloud-metadata-service-wed-aug-19th/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:39:11 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-20-simple-scans-for-cloud-metadata-service-wed-aug-19th/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Reinforces the need to enforce IMDSv2 (hop-limit 1, require session tokens) on all EC2/GCP/Azure VMs and audit IAM role assignments to minimize credential scope accessible via the metadata endpoint.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No new IOCs or campaign detail here, but a useful reminder to verify detections exist for unusual internal requests to 169.254.169.254, which can indicate SSRF or compromised workload attempts to harvest credentials.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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