<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Identity-Security on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/identity-security/</link><description>Recent content in Identity-Security on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 11:49:48 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/identity-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Identity Risks in AI Agent Deployments — CrowdStrike Analysis</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-11-the-identity-problem-hiding-in-ai-agent-deployments/</link><pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 11:49:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-11-the-identity-problem-hiding-in-ai-agent-deployments/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> AI agent identity risks (non-human identities, credential sprawl, OIDC/service account misuse) are an emerging design concern worth factoring into how agentic workloads are architected, but no patch or immediate action is indicated.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Understanding how AI agents acquire and use credentials could inform future detection logic around anomalous non-human identity activity, but no IOCs or TTPs are provided here.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> If your org is deploying AI agents, review whether your identity governance policies cover non-human agent credentials — this is a quarter-horizon policy gap before it becomes a control gap.&lt;/li>
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