<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ide-Security on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ide-security/</link><description>Recent content in Ide-Security on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:46:13 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ide-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AWS Kiro Agentic IDE Patched for Prompt Injection RCE</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-22-aws-kiro-flaw-let-a-poisoned-web-page-rewrite-its-config-and/</link><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:46:13 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-22-aws-kiro-flaw-let-a-poisoned-web-page-rewrite-its-config-and/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Developers running Kiro should update to the patched version; also review agentic tool permissions and consider whether your workflows allow Kiro to fetch and process arbitrary external URLs without human review of rendered content.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> This demonstrates a concrete prompt-injection-to-RCE chain in an agentic coding IDE — no IOCs or active exploitation to hunt for now, but the attack class (hidden page text hijacking agent actions) is worth understanding as AI coding tools spread across developer estates.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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