<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ide-Extension on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ide-extension/</link><description>Recent content in Ide-Extension on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:08 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ide-extension/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Malicious Claude Code extension on Cursor planted SSH backdoors</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-30-malicious-claude-code-extension-on-cursor-planted-ssh-backdo/</link><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:08 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-30-malicious-claude-code-extension-on-cursor-planted-ssh-backdo/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> If you use Cursor with the Claude Code extension, check whether you installed or updated it during the ~11-hour window on Oct 29; audit ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for unrecognized keys and rotate credentials accessible from the potentially compromised machine.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Sweep developer workstations for unauthorized SSH authorized_keys entries added around Oct 29 and hunt for outbound beacon activity from machines running Cursor; prioritize developers with access to production systems or CI/CD pipelines.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Act:&lt;/strong> Determine whether developers in your org use Cursor with the Claude Code extension; if so, direct an immediate sweep and assess whether compromised dev machines had access to sensitive systems or source code — this is the kind of developer-tooling supply-chain incident that can cascade into broader breaches.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>