<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hybrid-Kem on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/hybrid-kem/</link><description>Recent content in Hybrid-Kem on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 18:11:48 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/hybrid-kem/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Transcript-Bound Hybrid PQC Combiners Proven Downgrade-Resilient</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-21-transcript-bound-combiners-for-downgrade-resilient-hybrid-po/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 18:11:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-21-transcript-bound-combiners-for-downgrade-resilient-hybrid-po/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Formal proof that hybrid ML-KEM combiners without transcript binding can be fully downgraded by an active attacker; engineers designing or auditing custom hybrid PQC handshakes (TLS, SSH, IKE) should verify their key schedule binds the session key to a transcript hash, not just the raw KEM output.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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