<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Head-Mare on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/head-mare/</link><description>Recent content in Head-Mare on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 11:54:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/head-mare/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Head Mare Exploits TrueConf Flaws to Replace Installers with PhantomCore</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-11-trueconf-server-flaws-exploited-to-replace-client-installers/</link><pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 11:54:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-11-trueconf-server-flaws-exploited-to-replace-client-installers/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Head Mare&amp;rsquo;s technique of weaponizing a compromised server to replace client installers with PhantomCore malware is a supply-chain-adjacent TTP worth tracking, but targeting is confined to Russian firms and no IOCs or detection guidance are available from this summary.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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