<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hardware-Supply-Chain on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/hardware-supply-chain/</link><description>Recent content in Hardware-Supply-Chain on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:08 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/hardware-supply-chain/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Trezor warns of hardware implant in wallets sold by CryptoBilis reseller</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-30-trezor-warns-of-suspected-hardware-implant-in-one-of-its-wal/</link><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:08 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-30-trezor-warns-of-suspected-hardware-implant-in-one-of-its-wal/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> A physical implant with mobile-network exfiltration of recovery phrases is a vivid real-world example of hardware supply chain attacks via resellers; no action needed for enterprise cloud/app infrastructure, but worth incorporating into threat-model thinking for hardware procurement.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Provides concrete evidence that third-party hardware resellers represent a real supply chain attack vector; useful framing for hardware procurement policies, but no enterprise exposure assessment is warranted unless corporate treasury uses hardware wallets.&lt;/li>
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