<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hardware-Attack on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/hardware-attack/</link><description>Recent content in Hardware-Attack on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:32:56 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/hardware-attack/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP Memory Isolation</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-15-new-ddrop-attack-breaks-intel-tdx-and-amd-sev-snp-confidenti/</link><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:32:56 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-15-new-ddrop-attack-breaks-intel-tdx-and-amd-sev-snp-confidenti/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> DDRop undermines the threat model for confidential computing by exploiting memory write-drop behavior — engineers relying on TDX or SEV-SNP for workload isolation should understand this weakens TEE guarantees when supply-chain or physical access is a concern. No patch is applicable; audit whether your confidential-computing deployments assume physical integrity of the host.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> If your organization uses confidential computing (Intel TDX/AMD SEV-SNP) to satisfy compliance or data-isolation commitments, this research narrows the assurance claim — physical access plus software control can defeat those guarantees. File for the next risk-register review, no immediate action required.&lt;/li>
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