<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Google-Workspace on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/google-workspace/</link><description>Recent content in Google-Workspace on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 18:40:06 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/google-workspace/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions, bypasses MFA</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-11-04-google-calendar-phishing-campaign-hijacks-sessions-bypasses/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 18:40:06 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-11-04-google-calendar-phishing-campaign-hijacks-sessions-bypasses/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No patch target here — the attack abuses trusted Google services and legitimate redirect chains to steal sessions post-MFA. Use this to inform a review of phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) adoption in Google Workspace and session-lifetime policy tightening.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The technique (Calendar invite → trusted redirect → fake login → session cookie theft) is well-documented enough to build Workspace audit-log detections for anomalous OAuth token issuance and login events following Calendar invite interactions; no published IOCs yet to sweep against.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> This campaign illustrates that standard TOTP/push MFA does not stop session-hijacking phishing, which is relevant when reporting MFA coverage as a control to auditors or the board; note the gap in the risk register and revisit phishing-resistant MFA roadmap.&lt;/li>
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