<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Formal-Verification on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/formal-verification/</link><description>Recent content in Formal-Verification on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:42:13 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/formal-verification/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>SeL4 security proofs now complete on AArch64</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-26-sel4-security-proofs-now-complete-on-aarch64/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:42:13 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-26-sel4-security-proofs-now-complete-on-aarch64/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> SeL4&amp;rsquo;s completed formal correctness and security proofs on AArch64 matter for teams designing high-assurance system architectures; no immediate patch or config change required, but worth tracking if you&amp;rsquo;re evaluating hypervisors or TEE substrates.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Formal proof completion for a widely-cited secure microkernel strengthens the case for verified-OS investments in high-assurance or regulated environments; relevant background for future architecture or vendor-risk conversations.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Formal Verification of Noise Flooding Security in Homomorphic Encryption</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-17-verified-pythagorean-composition-for-adaptive-cryptographic/</link><pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 13:03:16 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-17-verified-pythagorean-composition-for-adaptive-cryptographic/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> This research tightens the security proof for noise flooding in approximate FHE schemes, showing the correct parameter bound is sqrt(qn)/2γ rather than linear in q. Relevant if you deploy or evaluate FHE libraries, but no immediate patching or configuration action needed.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>