<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Fastjson on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/fastjson/</link><description>Recent content in Fastjson on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:43:35 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/fastjson/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>FastJSON @JSONType RCE Lab: public exploit bypasses autoType=OFF</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-21-dinosn-fastjson-jsontype-rce-lab-106/</link><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:43:35 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-21-dinosn-fastjson-jsontype-rce-lab-106/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> A public Docker lab with a working one-payload exploit now exists for fastjson 1.2.66–1.2.83; critically, autoType=OFF and parseObject binding are not effective mitigations. Audit your dependency tree for fastjson in this range and upgrade to 1.2.84+ (or fastjson2), treating autoType-disabled deployments as unprotected.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The public exploit lab lowers the bar for threat actors to weaponize this Spring Boot class-loading RCE chain. Build or tune detections for unexpected outbound SSRF from Java application hosts followed by remote class loading activity; the SSRF→defineClass pattern is a distinct behavioral signal to hunt for in proxy and EDR telemetry.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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