<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Edr on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/edr/</link><description>Recent content in Edr on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 16:37:36 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/edr/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>EDR blind spots: 3 browser attack vectors that evade endpoint telemetry</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-02-the-edr-blind-spot-3-ways-browser-attacks-evade-endpoint-tel/</link><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 16:37:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-02-the-edr-blind-spot-3-ways-browser-attacks-evade-endpoint-tel/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> A useful framing of why session-theft, malicious extensions, and in-browser manipulation leave no classic EDR artifacts — informs decisions about adding browser isolation or enterprise browser controls to the defense stack, but no immediate patch or config action required.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The coverage gaps described (no process creation, no file writes for browser-based session theft) are worth addressing this quarter by evaluating browser telemetry sources — proxy logs, enterprise browser audit events, or identity provider anomaly detection — to compensate for what EDR won&amp;rsquo;t surface.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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